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Abstract. In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic
market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed
costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal
policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal
policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that
contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might
increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers’ surplus, instead of
increasing domestic profits.
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1 Introduction
There is a sizable literature studying the strategic import policy, i.e. the effects
of economic policy in a oligopolistic market subject to foreign competition [see,
for instance, Dixit (1984); Helpman (1984); Buffie and Spiller (1986); Eaton and
Grossman (1986); Laussel et al. (1988); Markusen and Venables (1988); Das and
Donnenfeld (1989); Krugman, 1989; Ono (1990); Krishna and Thursby (1991);
Barros and Cabral (1992)]. Such effects look different from those under perfect
competition, as often occurs in a second-best framework.
We are grateful to seminar audiences in Alicante, Toulouse and Viena and to J Friedman, C Herrero,
I Jime´nez-Raneda, F Marhuenda, A Mas-Colell, I Ortun˜o-Ortı´n, J A Silva, I Steedman, two
anonimous referees and an associate editor for helpful comments We are solely responsible for
any remaining error We acknowledge support from DGICYT under project PB 93 - 0940 and the
hospitality from Royal Complutense College
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Trade policy under positive fixed costs has been studied by Dixit and Kyle
(1985), Motta (1992) and Rowthorn (1992). The closest paper to ours’ is that by
Horstman and Markusen (1992). They show (in a model somewhat different from
ours’) that small changes in tariffs may yield large effects on welfare. However,
they do not characterize the optimal trade policy.
In this paper, we focus our attention on the second-best import policy, i.e. the
optimal import policy with the restriction that the domestic market is oligopolis-
tic. In order to make our point, we take the simplest model, namely Cournot
equilibrium with a given number of firms and an unique foreign firm. The task
of this paper is to characterize the shape of the second-best trade policy under
two alternative policy instruments: quotas and tariffs.
We first analyze the no fixed cost case. We show the following:
1) When quotas are the only policy instrument, second-best is neither a small
quota nor a quota for which domestic production is almost zero (see Proposition
1(i)). The second best is either free trade or complete protection (see Proposition
1(ii)). If domestic firms are efficient (resp. inefficient) relative to the foreign firm,
complete protection (resp. free trade) is second-best. If domestic and foreign firms
are identical, we find conditions under which complete protection is second-best
(see Proposition 1(iii)).
2) When the only policy instrument is a tariff on output we show that domestic
welfare is increasing in the tariff when domestic output is zero, and decreasing
when the foreign firm is inactive (see Proposition 2(i)). We show that the second-
best tariff exists, is interior, and, under an additional assumption, unique. We also
find a sufficient condition for the optimal tariff to be positive (see Proposition
2(ii)). Similar results can be obtained if the tariff is proportional to sales.
We remark that in contrast with the previous literature, the above results are
not restricted to linear demand functions, and we identify general conditions on
the demand function ensuring that the second-best policy exists, is unique and
is located in the interior (tariffs) or in the corner (quotas). In fact, our analysis
shows that existence and uniqueness are nontrivial issues.
Next, we assume that there is a unique domestic firm with a technology
characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost. Consequently, the
reaction of the domestic firm to certain trade policies is discontinuous.1 We
show the following:
3) The second-best quota may be complete protection, free trade or a level of
imports in which domestic firm’s profits are zero but domestic output is positive
(see Proposition 3). We call the latter situation Ramsey pricing.
4) If the available instrument is a tariff, the solution may be interior or corner.
The latter may be complete protection or Ramsey pricing either for the domestic
or for the foreign firm (see Proposition 4).
1 Positive fixed costs are usually associated to free entry (see Krugman 1979; Helpman 1981;
Venables 1985; Horstman and Markusen 1986; Markusen and Venables 1988) However, none of
these papers focuses on the impact of the discontinuous behaviour of the domestic firm on the design
of economic policy
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Summing up, under positive fixed costs, Ramsey pricing or protectionist tar-
iffs may be second-best. Moreover, the level of the optimal instrument may be
related to the underlaying parameters in a non intuitive way. Of course, these
conclusions are tentative until more general models had been analyzed, but this
is outside the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3
and 4 study respectively the cases of zero and positive fixed cost. Section 5 offers
our final comments. All proofs are gathered in an Appendix.
2 The model
There is a unique consumer with utility function u(x ) − px , where x is the
consumption of the homogeneous good and p is market price. We assume that
u(0) = 0, u ′(x ) > 0 and u ′′(x ) < 0 ∀ x . There are n domestic firms with cost
functions denoted by ci (xi ), i = 1, . . . , n where xi is the output of firm i . Let
xd =
∑n
i=1 xi be domestic output and πd = p.xd −
∑n
i=1 ci (xi ) be aggregate
domestic profits. There is a unique foreign firm with a cost function denoted by
cf (xf ) where xf stands for imports. Thus x = xd + xf . Cost functions of both
domestic and foreign firms are increasing and twice continuously differentiable
for strictly positive outputs.
The instruments in the hands of the government are tariffs and quotas. We
assume that the decision on them is prior to the decision of firms on outputs,
i.e., the government acts as a Stackelberg leader [for different assumptions on
the timing of the game see Gonza´lez-Maestre (1993) and Collie (1993)].
Domestic welfare, denoted by S , is the sum of producers’ and consumer’s
surpluses plus the rents captured by the government via tariffs, denoted by R,
i.e. S = u(x )− px +πd + R. Assuming that the consumer is perfectly competitive
we have that p = u ′ and therefore
S = u(x ) − u ′(x )xf −
n∑
i=1
ci (xi ) + R . (1)
We assume that firms are profit maximizers taking as given the outputs of
other firms and the policy instrument. Assuming interiority for domestic firms,
first order conditions of a Cournot equilibrium, relative to a quota Q and a tariff
t .xf read:
p(xf + xd ) + xi p′(xf + xd ) − c′i (xi ) = 0 i = 1, . . . , n , (2)
p(xf + xd ) + xf p′(xf + xd ) − c′f (xf ) − t ≥ 0, Q ≥ xf . (2′)
We will assume that for sufficiently large outputs costs are not recovered.
This allows us to restrict attention to a compact interval in which any possible
equilibrium must lie. All the subsequent assumptions must be understood as
referring to outputs in this interval. We now assume
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Assumption 1.
a) ∀ x , xj , p′′xj + p′ < 0, j = 1, . . . , n, f
b) p′ − c′′j < 0, j = 1, . . . , n, f .
This assumption (A.1 in the sequel) is standard in the Cournot model [see e.g.
Friedman (1982) Assumption 3, p. 496, and Brander and Spencer (1984)]. The
interpretation of A.1 is that marginal revenue declines faster than price and price
declines faster than marginal costs [see Helpman and Krugman (1989) p. 55].
A.1 implies that the profit function is strictly concave with respect to the
own output. This implies that (2) and (2′) are sufficient conditions of profit
maximization and that the Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique [see Friedman
(1982), Theorem 1, p. 496 and Collie (1992)].
Let x¯j , j = 1, . . . , n, f , be the output of firm j in the Cournot equilibrium
with no quotas. Another implication of A.1 is that firm f produces at least the
quota if the quota is smaller than equilibrium output of firm f with no quotas.
This follows from the fact that xf is decreasing on domestic output. Thus, the
quota will also be denoted by xf when Q ≤ x¯f .
3 The case of no fixed costs
In this section we characterize the second-best policy when there are no fixed
costs. We first consider that no tariff is available. Let S (xf ) be domestic welfare
in a Cournot equilibrium relative to the quota. Let β = β(x ) ≡ p′′(x )x/p′(x ). β
can be interpreted as the degree of concavity of the inverse demand function.
Then, we have our first result:
Proposition 1. Under A.1, the following properties hold:
i) Domestic welfare is decreasing in xf for small level of imports and increas-
ing in xf for small domestic output. Therefore, the second-best quota is not very
small or such that the domestic industry produces almost zero.
ii) If domestic firms are identical, the technology displays constant returns
to scale and β(x ) is non increasing on x , S (xf ) is quasi-convex on xf and the
second-best is either free trade or autarky.
iii) If all firms (including the foreign) are identical, the technology displays
constant returns to scale, and either n = 1 and the inverse demand function is
concave or n > 1, then the second-best policy is autarky.2
That a small level of imports reduces welfare has been proved in the case
of n = 1 by Eldor and Levin (1990). Proposition 1(i) shows that this property
2 Proposition 1 part iii) is different in the case of h identical foreign firms with constant returns
to scale In this case, easy calculations show that if h > n and β < 2 + 1/n , dSdxf (x¯f ) > 0 If
h = n , dSdxf (x¯f ) < 0 iff p() is concave And if h < n and A 1 holds,
dS
dxf
(x¯f ) < 0 Thus, the number
of foreign firms is a critical variable in the determination of the optimal quota The more foreign
firms are prepared to enter the domestic market, the less likely is that autarky is second-best since
with many foreign firms aggregate output is large, and if S ( ) is quasi-convex, domestic welfare is
maximized with free trade A similar case arises when only foreign firms have market power (see,
e g Helpman and Krugman 1989, p 63)
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holds for any n . In addition, it shows that a quota for which the domestic output
is almost zero can not be optimal. The intuition behind Proposition 1(i) is that
the effect of an increase in quotas on social welfare can be decomposed in two
elements. On the one hand a positive effect, which comes from an increase in
aggregate output caused by the increase in quotas. On the other hand, production
of domestic firms falls, which is socially harmful since price is higher than
marginal cost. Thus if xf is zero the first effect vanishes so that only the second
effect remains (see Ono 1990) and if domestic output is zero only the first effect
remains.
An implication of Proposition 1(i) is that there exists a quota for which
the derivative of S (xf ) equals to zero – so the first order condition of welfare
maximization is fulfilled – but total welfare is minimized. Therefore, the optimal
quota can not be found by calculus. This suggests that the second-best trade
policy is either free trade or complete protection. This intuition is confirmed by
Proposition 1(ii), which identifies sufficient conditions on the demand function
ensuring this property. This result has been obtained by Eldor and Levin (1990)
and by Laussel et al. (1988) in the case of linear demand and one domestic
firm (the last paper allows for some product differentiation which can be easily
introduced in our model). Notice that A.1 and our assumption on β allow for
inverse demand functions of the form p = a − xα, with α > 0 or p = e−bx with
b > 0 (in the last case, provided that x has an upper bound small enough).
It can be shown that, under A.1, x¯f is decreasing with the (constant) marginal
cost of the foreign firm (see Collie 1992). Thus, an interpretation of Proposition
1(ii) is that if domestic firms are relatively efficient, the output of the foreign firm
in a Cournot equilibrium with no quotas is small and it is likely that it is located
on the decreasing part of S ( ). Thus, autarky is the best policy. Conversely, if
domestic firms are relatively inefficient it is likely that the optimal policy is free
trade. Therefore, it is likely that second-best policy agrees with the commandment
“Do not protect the inefficient” (or “do not allow foreign mediocrities to enter”).
Proposition 1(ii) says that second-best policy is either autarky or free trade. If
S ( ) is decreasing at free trade, the quasi-convexity of S ( ) implies that domestic
welfare is maximized in autarky. Proposition 1(iii) provides a sufficient condition
for S ( ) to be decreasing at free trade.
Next we consider the case of a linear tariff on foreign output. The case
where the tariff depends on sales of the foreign firm (i.e. ad valorem tariff) can
be studied by similar methods.
It can be shown (see Collie 1992) that under A.1 there is a unique Cournot
equilibrium relative to t , i.e. a unique vector of outputs satisfying equations (2)
and (2′). Let S (t), xi (t), xf (t) and x (t), respectively, be domestic welfare, output
of domestic firm i , output of the foreign firm, and aggregate output, evaluated
in a Cournot equilibrium for a given tariff t .
We now concentrate on the characterization of the optimal tariff. In the fol-
lowing, we will assume constant marginal costs – denoted by c – and identical
firms (including the foreign).
Now, let us define t and ¯t , respectively, by the following conditions:
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p(x (t)) − c = 0 . p(x (¯t)) − c − ¯t = 0 .
In words, facing a tariff ¯t the foreign firm chooses zero output, while t is the
tariff for which domestic firms will choose zero output. (Note that t is a subsidy,
since t is negative). We have the following auxiliary result:
Lemma 1. Let us assume A.1 and that p(x ) tends to 0 when x tends to infinity,
then
(i) ¯t and t exist, and
(ii) xi (t) is increasing, xf (t) is decreasing and x (t) decreasing.
Moreover ¯t and t are unique.
Let t∗ be the second-best tariff, that is, the tariff which maximizes S (t). We
have the following result.
Proposition 2. Under A.1, constant returns to scale and identical firms (including
the foreign), the following properties hold:
i) If n ≥ 1, the domestic welfare is strictly decreasing at t = ¯t and strictly
increasing at t = t .
ii) t∗ exists, is positive and satisfies t < t∗ < ¯t if n ≥ 1. If β( ) is non decreasing
in x , S (t) is strictly quasiconcave and t∗ is unique.
Proposition 2(i) implies that a prohibitive tariff (that is, a tariff which implies
autarky) is never optimal. It also implies that it is not optimal to set a tariff
yielding a very small (but positive) level of domestic output. This result contrasts
with the one obtained in Proposition 1 for quotas since what is shown here is
that the second-best tariff is interior.
Proposition 2(i) has been proved in the case of n = 0 by Brander and Spencer
(1985). However they did not study the second order condition, so that they did
not prove neither existence nor uniqueness. In the case n ≥ 1, Collie (1991)
argued that t∗ is positive if p(x ) is “sufficiently concave”. However, although he
calculates the second order condition for a local maximum, he did not provide
sufficient conditions ensuring existence, uniqueness and interiority of second-best
tariffs. In the case of cost differences between domestic and foreign firms, Dixit
(1988) has analyzed the prohibitive tariff, when it is second-best.3
4 The case of positive fixed costs
In this section we analyze the case of positive fixed costs. In this case, the
behavior of firms becomes discontinuous at certain points and this complicates
the analysis of the optimal trade policy. In order to keep the analysis tractable,
we will simplify further the model by assuming a unique domestic firm with
3 Notice that t∗ is not always decreasing on the degree of competition Let h be the number of
foreign firms If u(x ) = ax−x2/2, t∗ = (a−c)(2n +1)/(h +2(n +1)2) Thus, for h large dt∗/dn > 0
(see Helpman and Krugman 1989, p 186)
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constant marginal cost (this is Assumption 2 below). Even in this case, we will
see that the main conclusions obtained in this section are considerably more
complex than those obtained in Sect. 3. These conclusions must be understood
as a warning that the results obtained in Sect. 3 do not generalize to the case of
positive fixed costs. More general assumptions than A.2 will produce even more
ambiguous results.
Assumption 2. There is a unique domestic firm whose cost function is given by
c(xi ) = K + cxi if xi > 0 and c(0) = 0.
Let xi (xf ) be the profit maximizing output of the domestic firm as a func-
tion of imports. Under A.1 a) this correspondence is single valued as long as
domestic profits are positive. If domestic profits are zero, there are two outputs
-one positive, the other zero- maximizing profits. In this case we assume that
the domestic firm produces a positive output. Thus xi (xf ) is single valued. Let
x (xf ) = xi (xf ) + xf . Define
xˆf = {xf | p(x (xf ))xi (xf ) − c(xi (xf )) = 0 , xi (xf ) > 0} .
In words, xˆf is the output of the foreign firm for which the maximum profits
of the domestic firms are zero, i.e. the output corresponding to limit pricing of
the foreign firm. We now show the following
Lemma 2. xˆf exists and if xi (xˆf ) > 0, it is unique.
Proof. If ∀ y , 0 ≥ p(y)y − c(y), then xˆf = 0. If ∃y such that p(y)y − c(y) ≥ 0
the median value theorem and our boundness assumptions imply the existence
of xˆf . Let us prove uniqueness. Suppose there are two different xˆf , denoted by
xˆf and xˆf ′ and without loss of generality assume that xˆf < xˆf ′ . Then we have
0 = p(x (xˆf ))xi (xˆf ) − cxi (xˆf ) ≥ p(xi (xˆf ′ ) + xˆf )xi (xˆf ′ ) − c(xi (xˆf ′ ))
and
p(x (xˆf ′ ))xI (xˆf ′ ) − cxi (xˆf ′ ) = 0 .
But since p( ) is decreasing
p(xi (xˆf ′ ) + xˆf )xi (xˆf ′ ) − c(xi (xˆf ′ )) > p(x (xˆf ′ ))xi (xˆf ′ ) − cxi (xˆf ′ ) = 0
which contradicts the first equality. 
unionsq
Lemma 2 simplifies the task of finding the second-best quota since it shows
that the function S (.) can be decomposed in two parts. If 0 ≤ xf < xˆf , S (.) looks
as in the no fixed cost case. When xˆf = xf , S (.) is multivalued but (according with
our assumption on xi (.)) we take the maximum value. Since in this allocation the
domestic firm is earning zero profits this is reminiscent of Ramsey pricing and the
corresponding welfare is denoted by S (R). If xˆf < xf , S (xf ) = u(xf )−p(xf )xf . Let
S (A) be the welfare at autarky, xf 0 the minimum output for which S (A) = S (xf ),
xf /= 0 and xf 1 the maximum output for which S (R) = S (xf ) (xf 0 and xf 1 might
be ∞) (see Figs. 1, 2).
Proposition 3. If A.1 a) and A.2 hold, A.1 b) holds for positive outputs and β(x )
is non increasing in x , the optimal quota exists and is characterized by
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Fig. 1. Domestic welfare as a function of imports if S (xˆf ) < S (0)
Fig. 2. Domestic welfare as a function of imports if S (xˆf ) > S (0)
(a) If S (A) > S (R) we have two possible cases
(a.i) xf = 0 if x¯f ≤ xf 0
(a.ii) xf = x¯f if x¯f ≥ xf 0
(b) if S (A) < S (R) we have four possible cases
(b.i) xf = 0 if x¯f ≤ xf 0
(b.ii) xf = x¯f if x¯f 0 ≤ x¯f ≤ xˆf
(b.iii) xf = xˆf if xˆf ≤ x¯f ≤ xf 1
(b.iv) xf = x¯f if x¯f ≥ xf 1
The case in which S (A) > S (R) works like the non-fixed cost case: if the
foreign firm has a relatively high marginal cost, total protection is the second-
best policy (case ai) and if the foreign firm has relatively low marginal cost,
free trade is the second-best policy (case aii). In other words, the choices are
total protection or free trade and the desirability of them depends on the relative
efficiency of the foreign competitor.
However the case in which S (A) < S (R) contains new features: A positive
quota less than the Cournot equilibrium output of the foreign firm might be
optimal and the desirability of free trade as second-best policy is not always
related to the relative efficiency of the foreign firm: for high values of the marginal
cost of the foreign firm total protection is second-best (case bi in Proposition 3),
for high-intermediate values of the marginal cost free trade is second-best (case
bii), for low-intermediate values of the marginal cost a quota of xˆf is second-best
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(case biii) and for low values free trade is second-best again (case biv). In other
words, S ( ) is no longer quasiconvex and the second-best policy is difficult to
characterize. The bottom line is now “do not protect the very inefficient, protect
the very efficient and be careful with the intermediate cases!” (see Figs. 1 and
2).4
Let us turn our attention to tariffs. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
t < ¯t and that S (t) < S (A) if t < t (i.e. domestic monopoly gives more welfare
than foreign monopoly: this is true under linear demand). Let t∗∗ be the second-
best tariff in the fixed cost model (recall that t∗ is the second-best tariff in the
non fixed cost case).
Proposition 4. Let us assume that the cost function of the foreign firm is
C (xf ) = F + cxf if xf > 0 and C (0) = 0. If A.1 a) and A.2 hold, A.1 b) holds for
positive outputs, and β(x ) is non decreasing in x , the optimal tariff exists and is
characterized by
a) t∗∗ > ¯t if t < ¯t < t∗ and S (¯t) < S (A) (see Fig. 3);
b) t∗∗ = ¯t if t < ¯t < t∗ and S (¯t) > S (A) (see Fig. 4);
c) t∗∗ = t∗ if t < t∗ ≤ ¯t (see Fig. 5).
d) t∗∗ = t if t∗ ≤ t < ¯t (see Fig. 6).
Fig. 3. Optimal tariff is t∗∗ > ¯t
According to Proposition 4, the second-best tariff depends on the efficiency of
both firms, measured by their fixed costs. If the domestic firm is efficient we have
three possible cases: A prohibitive tariff for high F (case (a)), Ramsey pricing
for the foreign firm for intermediate levels of F (case (b)) and an interior tariff
if F is small (case (c)). If the domestic firm is inefficient then the second-best
policy is Ramsey pricing for the domestic firm (case (d)).
Contrary to the continuous case, the second-best tariff might be not interior.
Dixit (1984, 1988) and Venables (1986), also obtained boundary solutions for
the case of no fixed costs but cost differences between domestic and foreign
firms. However in those models the prohibitive tariff is the only non-interior
solution, while our model offers additional possibilities (cases b and d). It is
4 With respect to the likelihood of cases a) or b) it can be shown that if the inverse demand
function is linear, S (A) > S (R) iff K is relatively high
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Fig. 4. Optimal tariff is t∗∗ = ¯t
Fig. 5. Optimal tariff is t∗∗ = t∗
Fig. 6. Optimal tariff is t∗∗ = t
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interesting to note that the intuition behind this two cases is very different from
the traditional protectionist arguments. The conventional intuition supporting a
protectionist tariff is that it helps the strategic position of domestic firms, thereby
increasing domestic profits, although consumers are worse-off. However, in case
(d) domestic profits are zero. Thus a protectionist tariff is not used here to increase
domestic profits but to increase domestic consumption and consumers’ surplus.
5 Final comments
In this paper we have studied the second-best import policy in an oligopolistic
market. Under zero fixed costs, if the policy instrument is a quota, the second-
best policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the
second-best policy is an interior solution. Contrary to previous contributions, we
identify general conditions under which those results hold. Under positive fixed
costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive
import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing consumers surplus,
not domestic profits.
In order to make our point we have chosen a particularly simple model. Thus,
important topics like product differentiation, interaction of domestic and foreign
markets, price-setting firms, dynamic issues, free entry, and subsidies to domestic
firms are not covered by our model. We hope that our paper will stimulate similar
research to ours on these areas.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.





































Since for all firms for which the first order condition is fulfilled with inequality





























Next, we will show that A.1 implies that dxddxf > −1 and that dxidxf < 0, i =
1, . . . , n (for the case of identical firms see Buffie and Spiller 1986, p. 68). First,
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first order conditions of profit maximization imply that if xf increases, neither x
nor xi , i = 1, . . . , n can be constant. Then, for a particular firm, say i , we have
four possible cases.
x increases and xi increases (a)
x increases and xi decreases (b)
x decreases and xi increases (c)
x decreases and xi decreases (d)
It is easy to see that Assumption 1 implies that cases (a) and (d) above are
impossible. Suppose that (c) is true. Then it must be that case (c) holds for every
i = 1, . . . , n . But since x = xf + xd this is impossible, so case (b) holds for all
firms and therefore dxddxf > −1 and dxidxf < 0, i = 1, . . . , n . Thus, this part follows
from these inequalities and equation (3) above. 
unionsq
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n(p′ + xi p′′) + p′ = −
n(q + t) + β





2 − 1 − β/n
(n + 1)(q + 1) + β .
By A.1 β > −n(q + 1) and thus (n + 1)(q + 1) +β > 0. Disregarding the case
in which xd = 0 (in which we know that dSdxf > 0), dSdxf = 0 iff q =
√
((1 + β/n)
(q > 0 by A.1). The last equation implies that the xf for which dSdxf = 0, denoted
by x ′f , is unique since q is increasing on xf and β is non increasing on x (which
in turn is increasing with xf ). Finally if xf > x ′f , q increases and β decreases so
dS
dxf > 0 and if xf < x
′
f , by identical reasoning dSdxf < 0. 
unionsq
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Proof of Lemma 1. To show existence, let z be such that p(z ) = c. Now choose
t such that the first order condition of profit maximization for the domestic firm
is satisfied when this firm produces z and z = x (t).
Let x∗ be the aggregate output corresponding to a Cournot equilibrium where
the foreign firm is inactive. Under A.1, x∗ exists. Let ¯t = p(x∗) − c. Facing a
tariff ¯t the foreign firm will choose zero output.
Let us now prove part (ii) of the lemma by calculating dxdt and
dxf
dt from the
first order conditions of profit maximization of every firm, i.e.
p + xi p′ − c = 0 , i = 1, . . . , n and
p + xf p′ − c − t = 0 .
Differentiating, we obtain that
dxf
dt =
p′ + p′/n + p′′xi




n[p′(1 + 2/n) + p′′(xi + xf /n)] . (7)
Now, we can calculate







p′[p′(1 + 2/n) + p′′(xi + xf /n)] . (8)
But, according to our assumptions, (6), (7) are negative and (8) is positive,
which completes the proof. Moreover, since xi (t) is strictly increasing and xf (t)
is strictly decreasing, ¯t and t are unique. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part (i): Let
dS
dt = p ·
dx
dt − p ·
dxf
dt − xf p









dt · [p − xf p
′ − c] + dxfdt · [t + c − p] + xf .




dt [t − 2xf p
′] + dxfdt p
′xf + xf . (9)
If t = ¯t > 0 then xf = 0 and the above derivative is negative in view of Lemma





+ xf , which is
positive in view of Lemma 1. 
unionsq





dt (t − p
′x ) + x .









p′(β + 2) [t + xp
′(β + 1)] , (10)
which is positive, under A.1, if t < 0. Also, when t is such that x is near enough
to zero, then dSdt is negative. Finally, domestic welfare is zero when x = 0.
Thus, S (t) can be redefined on a compact interval and the proof of existence is
completed, since S (t) is a continuous function of t .
First order condition of welfare-maximization implies dSdt = 0 so that the
optimal tariff must satisfy t∗ = −xp′(β + 1), which is positive under A.1. Now,
we will show that if β′(x ) ≥ 0, then F (t) ≡ −[t +xp′(β+1)] is strictly decreasing
which implies that S (t) is strictly quasi-concave, since F (t) has the same sign










But, according to our assumptions, dβdt = β
′ dx
dt ≤ 0, since dxdt < 0. Thus,
by A.1 the above derivative must be negative. Therefore, S (t) is strictly quasi-
concave and the optimal tariff is unique.
Case n ≥ 1: Since p(x (t)) − c = 0, from the first order conditions of profit
maximization of the foreign firm we obtain that t = xf p′. Thus, t is negative.
Thus, according to the proof of existence in the case n = 0, S (t) must be strictly
increasing for t ≤ t . On the other hand, Part (i) of this proposition implies that
there exists some t < ¯t yielding higher welfare than any t ≥ ¯t . Therefore, no
tariff outside the interval [¯t , t] can yield larger social welfare. Thus the Weirstrass
theorem and the continuity of S (t) ensures the existence.
Since t∗ belongs to [¯t , t], from Lemma 1(ii) it follows that t < t∗ < ¯t .
Therefore, expression (9) is the relevant derivative of S (t) in order to obtain t∗.









[t + 2n(p′ + p′′xi )xf + (p′ + p′′xf )xf ] , (11)
where A ≡ p′(1 + 2/n) + p′′(xi + xf /n) < 0 (from A.1).
From the first order condition of welfare-maximization, the above derivative
is equal to zero, which under our assumptions yields a positive t∗.
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Now, it remains to show that if β′(x ) ≥ 0, then S (t) is single picked, which
ensures that t∗ is unique. From the first order condition of a Cournot equilibrium,
it follows that t = p′(xf −xi ). Thus, by using the definitions of β(x ) and q ≡ xd/x ,









(1 − q2){2(n + 1)/(1 + q) − q/[n(1 − q2)] + β} .
But sign{ dS (t)dt } is the same as the sign of H (t) where this is defined as
H (t) ≡ 2(n + 1)/(1 + q) − q/[n(1 − q2)] + β .
By Lemma 1 x and q are strictly decreasing in t , while β is non decreasing in
x . Therefore, H (t) is strictly decreasing in t and S (t) is quasiconcave, so that t∗
is unique. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3. Existence of the optimal quota follows from the closed
graph of S ( ) and xf ∈ [o, x¯f ]. The characterization follows from the fact that
Proposition 2 implies that S (.) is quasi-convex on [0, xˆf ], and S (.) is strictly
increasing on (xˆf ,∞) (since ∂S∂xf = u ′ − p − p′xf = −p′xf > 0) (see Figs. 1 and
2). 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4. Cases a) and b) follow from S (t) < S (A) for t < t and
by noticing that S (t) is strictly increasing in [t , ¯t], due to Proposition 2(ii) (see
Figs. 3 and 4). Case c) is obtained by using a similar argument as in Proposition
2(ii) and noticing that S (A) < S (¯t) < S (t∗) (see Fig. 5). Case d) follows from
S (A) < S (¯t) and he fact that S (t) is decreasing in [t , ¯t] (see Fig. 6). 
unionsq
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